ABSTRACT

Recent religious liberty scholarship spotlights the legal rights of churches and similar religious institutions, as distinct from the rights of individual religious believers. Advocates of "the new religious institutionalism" argue that religious institutions need robust legal rights in order to effectuate their institutional functions and advance religious believers' interests. The Supreme Court recently fanned the new institutionalist flame by holding, in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, that the Constitution protects churches from legal liability for employment discrimination in hiring ministers. In this essay, Professor Magarian considers a complication that advocates of the new religious institutionalism have generally ignored: The Establishment Clause. Legal accommodation of religious believers has always operated in tension with nonestablishment values. Examining the past half century of legal doctrine, Professor Magarian finds a strong vein of tension between accommodation claims and nonestablishment values, especially acute in the scattered cases that have considered institutional accommodation claims. Since the Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, however, courts and scholars have given little thought to the accommodation-nonestablishment tension, because Smith both neutralized the Free Exercise Clause as a source of accommodations and marginalized the Establishment Clause as a check on accommodations. The new institutionalist call to increase accommodation of religious institutions compels renewed emphasis on the Establishment Clause as a limiting principle for accommodations. Religious institutions perform normatively valuable social functions by aggregating believers' interests and promoting pluralism in public discourse. At the same time, though, accommodating religious institutions raises sharper establishment concerns than accommodating individual religious believers, because institutions generally have greater scope and power than individuals. Professor Magarian contends that the Establishment Clause, whether understood in neutralist or separationist terms, counsels great caution in expanding institutional religious accommodations. He posits that both Hosanna Tabor and the recent political compromise over the contraception mandate in the Affordable Care Act, properly understood, represent imperfect but broadly appropriate reconciliations of the important, competing interests in institutional religious accommodation and nonestablishment.
INTRODUCTION
Religious accommodation -the practice of exempting religious believers, via either Free Exercise Clause mandate or government discretion, from legal obligations that conflict with religious commitments -has always occurred in tension with the Establishment Clause. Giving religious believers legal benefits that nonbelievers lack may advance religion, lack a credible secular purpose, or convey special government approval for the accommodated belief. For many years the Supreme Court engaged this tension. Although proclaiming a rule of presumptive mandatory accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court usually found reasons to deny mandatory accommodation claims. Meanwhile, the Court explicitly relied on the Establishment Clause to strike down most discretionary accommodations it considered. Then, in 1990, Employment Division v. Smith 2 seemed to resolve the tension. Smith effectively foreclosed claims for mandatory accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause, but it also marginalized the Establishment Clause by granting legislatures wide latitude to confer discretionary accommodations. Smith signaled the Court's strong disinterest in wrestling with any implications of the Establishment Clause for religious accommodations.
Last year, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC
3 announced that the Establishment Clause did not bar, but in fact joined with the Free Exercise Clause to compel, an exemption for churches from nondiscrimination laws in the hiring of ministers. Hosanna-Tabor dovetails with a recent surge in scholarly arguments that religious institutions should enjoy substantial autonomy from legal constraints. The new academic institutionalists, like the Hosanna-Tabor Court, follow Smith in substantially disregarding the tension between accommodation and nonestablishment. At the same time, institutionalists have noted the discontinuity between Smith, which repudiated the idea of constitutionally mandatory accommodations, and Hosanna-Tabor, which loosely embraces that idea. Indeed, some institutionalists hope Hosanna-Tabor contains the first stirrings of a doctrinal retreat from Smith. That hope, however, presents a puzzle. If the Justices move away from the Smith Court's disdain for mandatory accommodations, can it continue to avail itself of the Smith settlement between accommodation and nonestablishment interests, or must repudiation of Smith reawaken the Court's long-dormant concern about how those interests conflict? Even if Hosanna-Tabor merely encourages widespread discretionary institutional accommodations under the auspices of Smith, can the Smith settlement bear the weight of that development?
Religious institutions have sought accommodations before, but the paradigmatic claimant for accommodation has been the beleaguered individual believer. The Court usually has approached accommodation questions with individual claimants in mind. Focusing the case for accommodation on the interests of religious institutions compels a fresh examination of the distinctive establishment concerns that widespread institutional accommodation might entail. I think those concerns are substantial. The case for institutional religious accommodations carries considerable normative force. Religious institutions serve both to aggregate the interests of individual believers and to introduce distinctive perspectives and energy into public discourse in ways that individual believers cannot. At the same time, religious institutions can exercise considerable power in ways that individuals cannot. Broadly accommodating religious institutions would heighten anxiety under any forceful account of the Establishment Clause. This essay considers the old conflict between accommodationist and nonestablishment values in the fresh light of the new religious institutionalism. Even as I acknowledge the social value of religious institutions, I urge heightened attention to the establishment concerns that religious institutional accommodations present. To reconcile the competing values, I suggest that both Hosanna-Tabor, a mandatory accommodation, and the resolution of the recent contraceptive mandate controversy, a discretionary accommodation, provide useful models. Properly understood, both of these accommodations rebuke the disdain for religious dynamism expressed in Smith while also reanimating the Establishment Clause as a prudent constraint on religious institutional accommodations.
I. THE DOCTRINAL TENSION BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND NONESTABLISHMENT
The two core religious principles set forth in the First Amendment -that government shall neither prohibit the free exercise of religion nor establish religion -operate in tension with one another. Given the broad impact of government authority, the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause inevitably requires some conscious, religion-regarding actions by government. Even absent that mandate, government may choose to take such actions in a conscientious effort to respect religious exercise. Whenever government acts on religious believers' behalf, however, it risks promoting religion in potential violation of the Establishment Clause. 4 The area of legal doctrine that embodies this tension is religious accommodation: the circumstance in which a religious believer or entity either demands as a constitutional matter or asks as a discretionary matter that the government spare it from adherence to some generally applicable law that conflicts with the believer's or entity's religious obligations. conceptions of both. This essay, however, deals only with the sorts of cases that the Supreme Court has described and treated as dealing with religious accommodations. Those canonical accommodation cases, unlike other Religion Clause disputes, pit claims of religious compulsion against the government's interest in coercing or punishing private conduct. 10 Whether or not that distinction marks a real difference between accommodation disputes and other Religion Clause cases, the legal and cultural significance of the canonical accommodation cases makes them an important subject for critical inquiry.
The Sherbert Era: Engaging the Tension
The Supreme Court spent more than 25 years wrestling actively with questions of religious accommodation. The fruits of that engagement, while frustratingly inconsistent and sometimes cryptic, reflect serious effort to come to grips with the tension between accommodation and nonestablishment. In its 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 11 the Court announced that it would review religious accommodation claims under strict scrutiny. Applying that standard, the Sherbert Court upheld the demand of a Seventh-Day Adventist, who had been fired for her refusal to work on Saturdays, to receive unemployment benefits notwithstanding a state's rule denying benefits to workers fired for cause. The Sherbert Court only briefly considered Establishment Clause objections to accommodation, noting the minority status of the religion at issue and the lack any "involvement of religious with secular institutions."
12 Following Sherbert, the Court mandated accommodation in several other, essentially indistinguishable unemployment benefits cases. 13 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 14 the Court also granted Amish parents an exemption from a state requirement that children attend public schools, once again brushing aside Establishment Clause concerns.
15
For the most part, however, Sherbert proved to be a paper tiger. The Court in the Sherbert era approached strict scrutiny in ways that led it to deny every other demand for mandatory accommodation it considered. The Court rejected some claims because the challenged laws presented insufficiently weighty burdens on the plaintiffs' religious exercise to trigger strict scrutiny 10 For a more detailed effort to draw the boundaries of the religious accommodation genre, see 31 Amos is the sole Sherbert-era accommodation decision to transcend the cursory comments in Sherbert and Yoder by considering in some depth, and then rejecting, a serious Establishment Clause objection to a religious accommodation. The questionably secular nature of what the Amos Court found to be the accommodation's pivotal "secular purpose" only renders the Court's embrace of the accommodation that much more striking and singular. As we will see, the central issue in Amos -a church's desire to avoid government regulation of certain employment decisions -has animated the Court's recent reentry into the mandatory accommodation field.
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Notably for present purposes, the Sherbert-era cases reveal a pronounced judicial concern with the establishment dangers of institutional religious accommodations. The Court has never distinguished between individual and institutional accommodations as doctrinal categories. However, the primary set of accommodations the Court mandated under the Free Exercise Clause during the Sherbert period -in the unemployment benefit cases -were individual rather than institutional. Yoder broadly accommodated a group of adherents to a particular religion. In contrast, the Sherbert-era Court did not grant any mandatory accommodations to religious institutions, and most of the mandatory accommodation claims it rejected were institutional rather than individual. As for the discretionary accommodation cases, all but Thornton -a group accommodation case like Yoder -involved institutional rather than individual accommodations, and the Court struck down all of the challenged discretionary accommodations under the Establishment Clause, with the significant exception of Amos. The Sherbert-era religious accommodation jurisprudence reveals far greater concern about establishment in institutional accommodation cases than in individual accommodation cases.
The Smith Settlement
The Court in 1990 overhauled its religious accommodation jurisprudence in a way that tacitly settled the accommodation-nonestablishment conflict.
Employment Division v. Smith
33 presented a Free Exercise Clause challenge by two members of the Native American Church, which treated ingestion of peyote as a sacrament, to their exclusion from unemployment benefits because they were fired for their drug use. The Court rejected the claim and all but foreclosed future mandatory accommodation claims. Justice Scalia's majority opinion abandons 31 Id. at 335. 32 See infra notes 88-91, 126-146 and accompanying text (discussing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)). 33 494 U.S. 872 (1990). two dubious touchstones of the Sherbert era: the increasingly facetious claim that strict scrutiny was the operative standard of review for mandatory accommodation cases, and the practice of rejecting mandatory accommodation claims by manipulating that standard. In their place, the opinion introduces two new dubious touchstones. First, it eviscerates the Free Exercise Clause as a source of mandatory accommodations, holding that mandatory accommodation claims warrant only rational basis review. 34 Second, it encourages legislatures to accommodate religion however they see fit, effectively neutralizing the Establishment Clause as well in the accommodation setting. 35 Justice Scalia barely mentions the Establishment Clause. It plays no role at all in his repudiation of the Sherbert approach to mandatory accommodation, which he treats purely as an excessive construction of the Free Exercise Clause. Although Smith says nothing about Larkin, Estate of Caldor, or Texas Monthly, the Court's approach to discretionary accommodation leaves those cases in the rearview mirror.
Congress, in response to Smith, enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restores strict scrutiny for mandatory accommodation claims by requiring government agencies to exempt religious believers from any legal obligations that "substantially burden" religious exercise, unless an agency can show that enforcing the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish a compelling government interest. 36 In 43 that it "alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise," 44 that it "does not differentiate among bona fide faiths," 45 and that the Court's rejection of the facial challenge does not foreclose future Establishment Clause challenges to particular applications of the provision. 46 In addition, because the challenged provision involves religious exercise in prisons, the decision deals only with individual accommodations. Cutter mainly reiterates the old news that not all discretionary accommodations violate the Establishment Clause. At the same time, the decision pushes back against Smith by reminding us that some discretionary accommodations may violate the Establishment Clause.
The only post-Smith case in which the Supreme Court has considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a particular discretionary accommodation sustains the challenge. 47 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 48 a sharply divided Court held that New York violated the Establishment Clause when it established a special school district for the adherents of a single, insular religious group, the Satmar Hasidim. The heart of the Court's objection to New York's action is that it "singles out a particular 40 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring). 41 religious sect for special treatment," 49 violating a principle of religious neutrality. 50 Neutrality in Religion Clause jurisprudence is a notoriously slippery framework, 51 and Kiryas Joel sheds no great light on the Court's grounds for permitting discretionary accommodation in some instances while forbidding it in others. The Court's holding, however, makes clear that the Establishment Clause retains some vitality as a check on government discretion to accommodate religion, while Justice Scalia's impassioned dissent 52 supports the inference that his Smith opinion entails a weak account of the Establishment Clause. Notably for present purposes, Kiryas Joel also represents the Court's only constitutional decision, in the years between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor, about an institutional accommodation. The reasoning and result of Kiryas Joel echo the anxiety about institutional accommodations that characterizes the Sherbert-era decisions.
II. NEW CHALLENGES FROM RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM
The cases discussed in Part I, viewed as a whole, strongly suggest that institutional accommodations raise deeper concerns than individual accommodations under the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. In the Sherbert era, the Court granted some individual mandatory accommodations but rejected institutional claims for mandatory accommodations. The Court also sustained Establishment Clause challenges in the majority of discretionary accommodation cases, most of which involved institutional accommodations. Smith muted religious accommodation as a constitutional issue, but Kiryas Joel reflected a lingering Establishment Clause concern about discretionary institutional accommodations. The new religious institutionalism, fostered in the academy and intensified by Hosanna-Tabor, destabilizes the Smith settlement and compels renewed consideration of the accommodation-nonestablishment tension in the institutional setting.
A.
The New Institutionalism and the AccommodationNonestablishment Tension 49 Id. at 706 (footnote omitted). 50 See id. at 707. 51 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note 5, at 239-44 (criticizing the Court's reliance on neutrality as a basis for resolving religious accommodation disputes). 52 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Normative Appeal of Institutional Religious Accommodation
The surge in religious institutionalist scholarship has complicated and enriched the legal debate over the appropriate scope and nature of religious accommodations. The case for increasing accommodation of religious institutions carries substantial normative force. I do not attempt here to examine the full range of arguments in favor of increased religious institutional autonomy. I merely sketch the contours of two sorts of arguments that I find both normatively appealing and less threatening to nonestablishment values than some other institutionalist arguments. Both address the instrumental value of religious institutional autonomy for a robust democratic culture. The first emphasizes the value of religious institutions for realizing the interests of individual religious believers. I call this the aggregation argument. The second emphasizes the value of religious institutions for making public discourse more diverse and dynamic. I call this the pluralist argument. 53 Both the aggregation and pluralist arguments apply to a broad range of civil society institutions beyond religious institutions. 54 Religious institutionalist scholars, however, make particular claims about how religious institutions serve aggregation and pluralist ends.
The aggregation argument for increased religious institutional autonomy posits that taking the legal rights of individual religious believers seriously must, as a practical matter, mean taking the legal rights of religious institutions seriously. Religious institutions bring believers together to form and manifest religious commitments. often furthers individual religious freedom as well." 58 Even beyond this strengthening of individual liberty, some religious believers and traditions conceive religious exercise as an essentially communal activity, making legal protection of individual conscientious rights inadequate to protect their religious freedom. 59 The pluralist argument for religious institutional autonomy builds on Fred Schauer's contention that First Amendment doctrine should take account of the ways in which various civil society institutions, including the media, universities, and electoral structures, substantially advance public knowledge and information while providing important counterweights to the influence of government and the market. 60 I have argued elsewhere that religious arguments make an important, positive contribution to public political discourse, even -especially -when religious messages threaten to destabilize settled understandings of political matters. 61 Religious institutionalist scholars offer a rich account of how religious institutions drive that contribution. Paul Horwitz explains that religious institutions, particularly core religious institutions such as churches, "help form, shape, and propagate public discourse," placing them firmly in the category of what he calls "First Amendment institutions." 62 Religious institutions, characteristically focused on questions of morality and transcendent value, play a major role in developing the normative arguments that animate liberal political processes. 63 An especially important aspect of religious institutions' normative contribution is their tendency to oppose and resist government assertions of authority. 64 More broadly, religious institutions often question and reject majoritarian consensus on difficult issues, advancing novel ideas that can help to unsettle status quo understandings and promote dynamic social change.
65
Some religious institutionalist scholars may view my sympathy for the aggregation and pluralist arguments as damning with faint praise. Both of those arguments, as I have framed them, are entirely instrumental. In contrast, the dominant tendency in the new institutionalism is existential, claiming for religious institutions a measure of parallel sovereignty under the law that overlaps state authority. This sort of argument maintains that religious institutions emerge on the social landscape through some organic process. Because of their independence of the state and their structural importance in counterbalancing state power, religious institutions should be understood as sovereign within a certain range of activity. Accordingly, the state has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with religious institutions, leaving internal governance mechanisms to resolve most of their problems.
66 Sovereignty arguments often draw upon theological accounts of religious institutions' social function, 67 although they usually disclaim theological authority.
68 A thorough critique of sovereignty arguments lies well beyond the scope of this article. I simply note that I find those arguments unpersuasive. Granting parallel sovereignty to civil society institutions runs counter to the republican principles that undergird our contemporary law and politics. 69 In addition, sovereignty arguments face a problem with authority. Who determines the "proper" scope of religious institutions' and states' sovereignty? Theologically grounded sovereignty arguments provide an easy answer, but implementing it would violate the Establishment Clause in spectacular fashion. Absent divine authority, sovereignty arguments must either default to state boundary-drawing or depend on free-floating normative claims 65 that have to contend in the political and legal arenas with competing claims. Both of those approaches, whatever their virtues, give sovereignty away.
Although I reject sovereignty arguments for religious institutional autonomy, I believe religious institutions have distinctive, though not exclusive, grounds for asserting autonomy and thus pursuing certain accommodations. Arguments that no sort of civil society institution advances such democratic values as aggregation and pluralism more than any other 70 strike me as unduly formalist. Certainly a wide range of institutions -political parties, labor unions, service organizations -make important contributions to public discourse. Religious institutions, however, have the unusual virtue of bringing people together to develop and advance beliefs about deep questions of human existence.
71 Some nonreligious institutions as well perform that same function, and I think the law should extend them similar accommodations. 72 In addition, the category of "religious institutions" is neither monolithic nor simple. 73 Even so, religious institutions comprise a discernible category within civil society that maintains a distinctive commitment to pursuing a certain kind of democratically valuable activity. In this respect, religious institutions run parallel to universities and the media. 74 All three categories of institutions make distinctively valuable contributions to public discourse, and each has distinctive needs under the law. Universities need academic freedom; the media needs press shield laws; religious institutions need certain accommodations to protect religious exercise. Religious institutions do not have unique value, but they have distinctive value, and I believe the law can and should take account of that value. The difficult question is what constraints the Establishment Clause imposes.
The New Institutionalism's Limited Attention to Establishment Concerns
In the last century, advocates of religious accommodation often confronted the Establishment Clause directly, contesting arguments that it should constrain accommodations. 75 As discussed above, however, the Court's settlement in Smith of the religious accommodation question, while minimizing the Free Exercise 70 See, e.g., id. at 31-37. 71 See Gedicks, Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 57, at 161-62 (qualifying religious groups for autonomy as to membership decisions based on the idea that such groups "create rather than merely reflect values"). 72 Clause as a source of mandatory accommodations, also sidelined the Establishment Clause as a basis for objecting to discretionary accommodations. 76 Moreover, under the sort of sovereignty argument that dominates the new institutionalist scholarship, the notion of an accommodation-nonestablishment tension becomes incoherent: government need not accommodate religious institutions but simply must respect their parallel sovereignty. Thus, for both doctrinal and theoretical reasons, the new institutionalists have said almost nothing about the possibility that a robust doctrine of institutional accommodations might present heightened establishment concerns.
Carl Esbeck has argued, since well before the current wave of religious institutionalist scholarship, that the Establishment Clause operates not as a guarantee of individual rights but as a structural constraint on government action. 77 As a result, he maintains, the Establishment Clause works in tandem with the Free Exercise Clause to bar government from interfering with the autonomy of religious institutions. 78 The idea that the Establishment Clause does not restrain but rather empowers religious institutions has influenced the new institutionalists. Professor Horwitz argues that "a strong regime of nonestablishment" strengthens arguments for religious institutional autonomy by encouraging competition among religions. 79 In particular, he sees the Establishment Clause as supporting religious institutional claims on questions of public funding and access to public resources 80 but limiting symbolic endorsements of religion by government. 81 In advocating a broad, jurisdictional ministerial exception 82 and a robust regime of individual and institutional religious accommodations 83 under his conception of sphere sovereignty, Horwitz does not consider any implications of the Establishment Clause. Steven Smith posits a "church focused jurisprudence" that grants special constitutional status to "the church" but denies special status to "religion."
84 Under his approach, the Establishment Clause apparently would not impede any government support for religion short of a literal endorsement: government could provide direct financial 76 81 See id. at 128-29. 82 See id. at 118-22. 83 See id. at 124-27. 84 See Smith, supra note 68, at 33-38. aid to churches, which Smith analogizes to foreign sovereigns, and endorse religious beliefs. 85 The Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor 86 catches the new institutionalist wave, placing unprecedented judicial support behind the idea that the Establishment Clause does not bar but rather mandates at least some religious institutional accommodations. In affirming that churches enjoy an exemption from federal antidiscrimination law for decisions about hiring "ministers," Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for a unanimous Court relies on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The Free Exercise Clause "protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments," while the Establishment Clause "prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions."
87 Michael McConnell, noting that no prior Supreme Court decision invoked the Establishment Clause in support of religious institutional autonomy, suggests that Hosanna-Tabor "could have major ramifications" for Religion Clause doctrine. 88 Whether Hosanna-Tabor really portends a broad new doctrine of institutional (or other) accommodations, let alone conscripts the Establishment Clause to drive such a doctrine, remains open to question. 89 The decision, however, at least tracks the new institutionalists' disregard for establishment concerns and provides fuel for McConnell's speculation.
My colleague John Inazu, in an article that outlines differences between Catholic-and Protestant-derived accounts of religious institutional autonomy, suggests that the Establishment Clause would present problems for an institutional accommodation doctrine that favored particular structures of "churches."
90 This is an important point, and it resonates with an admonition in Hosanna-Tabor by the odd couple of Justices Alito and Kagan, although they take no account of establishment concerns. 91 Religious institutions vary widely in the rigidity and complexity of their institutional structures, the nature and extent of the authority they exercise over individual believers, and the nature and extent of their 85 90 See Inazu, supra note 66, at 34 n.143 (positing that "disparate treatment of church-affiliated and non-church-affiliated religious institutions may raise Establishment Clause concerns"). 91 See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Because virtually every religion in the world is represented in the population of the United States, it would be a mistake if the term 'minister' or the concept of ordination were viewed as central to [the ministerial exception].").
engagement with government and civil society. Any legal doctrine of institutional accommodation that even unwittingly fit one or a few sorts of religious institutional structures, but not others, would present an especially acute sort of problem under the Establishment Clause. Inazu's concern, however, also strikes me as relatively narrow. Every religious institution has some sort of structure, exercises some sort of authority over its individual members, and engages in some way with government and civil society. The broad question that interests me is whether even an ecumenical doctrine of robust institutional accommodation would present more serious establishment concerns than a doctrine of accommodation focused on individual believers.
B.
The
Enhanced Establishment Dangers of Institutional Accommodations
Any move to enhance substantially the number and scope of religious accommodations would compel renewed attention to the tension between accommodation and nonestablishment. The new religious institutionalism compels that attention because of religious institutions' distinctive capacity to work their will in society. Institutions are bigger and generally more powerful than individuals, and that distinction should make a difference under the Court's Establishment Clause precedents. The same characteristics that make religious institutions normatively valuable also make institutional accommodations especially threatening to nonestablishment interests. Religious institutions' ability to aggregate and represent the interests of individual religious believers gives religious institutions great power, both over believers themselves and in society generally. Likewise, religious institutions' ability to help enrich a pluralistic democratic culture entails power to influence cultural norms and practices. Religious institutions commit substantial resources to achieving desired policy ends in ways that individual religious believers cannot. 92 Institutional accommodations, as distinct from individual accommodations, raise special problems under any robust nonestablishment principle. I will briefly discuss the two most prominent such principles: neutrality and separation.
A robust account of neutrality in the Religion Clause setting, by Douglas Laycock's influential account, lets religion "proceed as unaffected by government as possible."
93 That sounds like a charter for accommodation, and indeed, Laycock deplores the Court's abandonment of mandatory accommodation in 92 For a discussion, outside the accommodation-nonestablishment context, of dangers that religious institutions' power might present under a regime of institutional autonomy, see Schragger and Schwartzman, supra note 71, at [27] [28] [29] [30] . 93 Laycock, supra note 4, at 1002.
Smith.
94 Likewise, the Court invoked neutrality when it dismissed Establishment Clause concerns raised by the mandatory accommodation in Sherbert v. Verner.
95
The trouble with this formulation is that government "affects" religion both when it acts and when it fails to act. 96 Thus, neutrality is in the eye of the beholder.
97
When the government exempts an individual believer from a generally applicable legal obligation, we can plausibly see the government as getting out of the believer's way. Everyone has conscientious commitments, and individual accommodation may reflect an effort, however imperfectly realized, to respect everyone's commitments to the greatest extent possible. Neutrality, however, becomes more difficult to assert when accommodation shifts from individuals to institutions. Institutional accommodations will likely differentiate among religions with different sorts of institutional structures, between institutions that want or need highly consequential exemptions from legal obligations and those that do not, and between religious and secular institutions. In particular, we should expect that larger, more cohesive religious institutions will likelier pursue and secure accommodations. The ideal of neutrality seems to sit uncomfortably with the realities of institutional religious accommodation.
Separationist accounts of the Establishment Clause proceed from the holding of Everson v. Board of Education
98 that the First Amendment creates "a wall between church and state [that] must be kept high and impregnable." 99 That principle "comprehensively forbid[s] every form of public aid or support for religion." 100 Exempting religious believers from laws that others must obey certainly looks like aid and support. The pivotal distinction between forbidden "aid or support" and permissible or mandatory noninterference requires difficult, inevitably contingent exercises in distinguishing "church" from "state." Certain religious institutional activities, such as clergy hiring, may stand farther apart 94 See id. at 1009-10. That Smith itself has been characterized as a neutralist decision, see, e.g., Lupu and Tuttle, supra note 58, at 70-71, underscores the elusive character of neutrality as a legal principle. 95 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). 96 Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 36-37 (1993) (contending that government regulation of speech is ineradicable in the modern regulatory state). 97 Perception becomes especially pivotal when we assess neutrality under a "nonendorsement" approach. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (requiring "that government must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 98 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 99 Id. at 18. 100 Id. at 32. from the state than more idiosyncratic individual religious activities do. 101 In general, however, a separationist account of nonestablishment resists immunizing institutional religious activities from generally applicable law. Separationism reflects acute awareness about the power that religious institutions can exercise. 102 Thus, it entails heightened concern with institutional as opposed to individual religious accommodations. The beleaguered Establishment Clause test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 103 a product of separationism, requires not only that government avoid entanglement with religion but also that government action have both a primarily secular purpose and an effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 104 The more an accommodation enhances religious institutional power, the more difficult to disassociate its purpose from religion and the harder to deny that it advances religion.
In an analysis elsewhere of discretionary accommodations under RFRA, I suggest how government might provide substantial religious accommodations without transgressing even a strongly separationist account of the Establishment Clause.
105 That analysis does not consider institutions as a doctrinal category but implicitly assumes a paradigm of individual accommodation. Reconsideration of my proposed approach through the prism of institutional accommodation helps to illustrate the ways in which a move toward institutional accommodation would exacerbate Establishment Clause concerns. My proposals may not exhaust the possibilities for accommodation consistent with the Establishment Clause, but the difficulty of adapting them to a regime of heightened institutional accommodation shows the increased Establishment Clause stakes that such a regime would entail.
First, government could broadly "equalize" accommodation, and obviate Establishment Clause problems, by accommodating not just theistic beliefs but also similar nontheistic conscientious commitments. 106 The Supreme Court modeled this approach in its handling of Vietnam-era provisions for conscientious objections to military service. 107 This inclusive approach could work reasonably well for a wide range of individual accommodations. A person might have serious theistic or nontheistic conscientious reasons for wanting to use certain drugs, not wanting to work on certain days, and so forth. 108 Individual religious commitments can have secular analogues, because individual believers and nonbelievers are always more alike than different. Some religious institutions have rough secular analogues: a secular group may want to exclude women or gays for reasons superficially similar to a church's reasons for wanting to exclude nonbelievers. Few secular institutions, however, claim as a substantial purpose promoting conscientious commitments of the sort that typically support religious accommodations. 109 No true secular analogue exists to "organized religion." Accordingly, the equalization approach, as a way of alleviating Establishment Clause concerns about strictly religious accommodations, translates poorly to institutional accommodations.
As an alternative to equalization, government could grant at least two sorts of specifically religious accommodations without violating the Establishment Clause: "egalitarian accommodations," designed to ensure that adherents of more and less prominent religious beliefs receive equal treatment;
110 and "idiosyncratic accommodations," exemptions from generally applicable laws that nonbelievers simply do not want.
111 Egalitarian accommodation, in theory, should work as well for institutions as for individuals: government should treat a small, fringe church no better or worse than it treats a large, mainstream church. Extending egalitarian accommodation to institutions, however, presents an analytic problem and a normative concern. Analytically, the greater prominence and notoriety of religious institutions makes ascribing inequitable treatment of institutions to the inadvertent effects of generally applicable laws less plausible than in the individual setting. Institutional inequities seem likely to reflect deliberate discrimination rather than mere nonaccommodation. 112 Normatively, the appeal of egalitarian accommodation lies in its benefits to socially powerless individuals. Minority religious institutions certainly have less power than mainstream religious institutions, but every religious institution, no matter how socially marginal, exercises power in ways that individuals, acting alone, cannot. Thus, even egalitarian institutional accommodations may aggrandize powerful actors in ways that comparable individual accommodations do not. Extending the idea of idiosyncratic accommodation to institutions presents more straightforward 108 problems. Even if we start from the questionable premise that institutions can have the same sorts of idiosyncrasies as individuals, accommodating a religious institution's idiosyncratic needs is likely to be more consequential, emphatic, and costly.
If Hosanna-Tabor ushers in a robust new regime of mandatory religious institutional accommodations, then the Smith settlement will disappear. Pressure will grow for nonestablishment principles to counterbalance the constitutional bases for institutional accommodations. If, as seems more likely, the new religious institutionalism merely changes governments' emphasis in granting discretionary accommodations under RFRA and analogous state laws, then the Smith Court's implicit call to ignore the Establishment Clause as a check on discretionary accommodation will become harder to take seriously. More cases like Kiryas Joel will emerge, in which the breadth and consequences of institutional accommodations increase the likelihood that Courts will openly invoke the Establishment Clause to constrain government decisions to accommodate religious institutions. How and to what extent, in either of these circumstances, should Establishment Clause doctrine modulate the underlying normative conflict between the benefits and dangers of institutional religious accommodation?
III. MEDIATING THE TENSION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND NONESTABLISHMENT
I have posited that an enhanced regime of institutional religious accommodations would require renewed consideration of the accommodationnonestablishment tension. The two most prominent recent disputes involving institutional religious accommodation -the Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church v. EEOC 113 and the controversy over a federal regulation that included religious employers in a mandate to provide health insurance coverage for contraceptives -provide hope for an approach to institutional religious accommodation that both respects the value of religious institutions and alleviates establishment concerns. Neither dispute reached a fully principled, universally satisfactory resolution. No constitutionally tidy basis for resolving accommodation disputes seems available, and normative considerations will inevitably influence even the most earnest judicial and legislative efforts to craft a workable approach. I offer no view here about whether either of these resolutions is wise in any broad normative sense. Both of them, however, provide useful models of how to accommodate substantial religious interests while averting the most serious establishment dangers.
One theme that permeates the Court's accommodation decisions, and informs my discussion here, is the importance of maximizing accommodation's value for beneficiaries while diminishing its costs to nonbeneficiaries.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
114 the leading decision that rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to an institutional accommodation, emphasizes the importance of the accommodation to the beneficiary's internal functioning. 115 In contrast, Sherbert-era cases that denied discretionary accommodations emphasized costs to nonbelievers of impermissibly advancing religion, 116 while cases that denied mandatory accommodations frequently maintained that the requested accommodations would bring negligible religious benefits. 117 
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,
118 the leading case that sustains an Establishment Clause challenge to an institutional accommodation, relies on an account of religious neutrality that emphasizes the accommodation's preference for the benefited sect over other religions. 119 Concerns about the consequences for nonbelievers of governments' advancing religion animate the separationist account even more obviously than they animate the neutrality account in Kiryas Joel. In contrast, the accommodations approved in Sherbert v. Verner, 120 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 121 and Amos appear to impose limited and diffuse costs on nonbelievers. 122 This insight can help guide efforts to reconcile institutional religious accommodation with nonestablishment. 123 A.
Hosanna-Tabor as a Model for Limited Mandatory Accommodation of Religious Institutions
The scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor that both Religion Clauses mandate a ministerial exception to generally applicable employment laws for churches' ministerial hiring remains unclear. Some scholars have suggested that Hosanna-Tabor may usher in a new era of mandatory religious accommodation, particularly institutional accommodation. 124 Others have viewed Hosanna-Tabor as a narrow validation of a particular, narrowly defined sort of accommodation. 125 This debate bears heavily on the role of the Establishment Clause in determining the appropriate boundaries of religious institutional accommodation. If Hosanna-Tabor has opened the floodgates of institutional accommodation, then the Establishment Clause will remain marginalized, except to the extent it actually speeds the accommodationist flow. If, on the other hand, Hosanna-Tabor only announces a narrow, circumscribed ministerial exception, it may suggest the sort of implicit Establishment Clause caution that I contend characterizes the Court's pre-Smith mandatory accommodation decisions. 126 I think the latter reading is both more plausible and more normatively appealing.
The Hosanna-Tabor opinion provides support for either a broad or a narrow reading. On the broad side, first, the facts of the case are neither sympathetic nor tidy. Hosanna-Tabor fired a teacher, Cheryl Perich, because she got sick, pushed to return to her duties, and asserted her legal rights when the church refused.
127 The church's ascription of its actions to its Christian mission makes for no small irony. Moreover, Perich's job entailed mainly nonreligious teaching, but all nine Justices agreed to classify her as a "minister."
128 Second, the Court did a poor job of distinguishing Employment Division v. Smith.
129 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that Smith did not foreclose a ministerial exception because that decision "involved government regulation of only outward physical acts," while the ministerial exception implicates "government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself." 130 That formulation does little work. Hiring a minister certainly involves "outward physical acts," while banning sacramental peyote "affects the faith and mission of the church." Finally, as discussed above, Hosanna-Tabor not only fails to discuss the Establishment Clause as a constraint on the ministerial exception but actually enlists the Establishment Clause as a source of the exception, a move that could portend a doctrinal shift in favor of accommodation without concern about establishment. 131 In my view, however, more and stronger elements of Hosanna-Tabor support a narrow reading. First, and most obviously, the decision was unanimous. Religion Clause decisions routinely splinter the Court and generate a mix of angry and hair-splitting partial concurrences and dissents. To ascribe broad significance to any unanimous decision on the constitutional law of religion seems to me highly dubious. In particular, the Court's liberal justices have never shown the slightest inclination to hold that the Establishment Clause only promotes religious institutional autonomy. Second, while Hosanna-Tabor provides a generous ministerial exception, the Court did not give religious institutions everything they wanted. The Court did not simply accept the church's assertion about Perich's ministerial status, as Justice Thomas would have done, 132 but rather engaged in a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to validate the assertion. 133 That analysis was deferential, but it fully preserved judicial power to determine whether the exception applies in a given case. In addition, the Court styled the exception as "an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar," 134 effectively repudiating church "sovereignty" as a basis for the exception. 135 Third, the ministerial exception seems to strike even some skeptics of religious institutional autonomy as a compelling accommodation claim; 136 and, as Judge McConnell reminds us, the Establishment Clause historically grounds the exception in a distinctive way. 137 Finally, although the Court failed to state a persuasive basis for distinguishing Hosanna-Tabor from Smith, a fairly straightforward basis is available. Smith did not categorically bar mandatory accommodation claims; rather, it held that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious exercise need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest."
138 Given the widespread support for some sort of ministerial exception, the Free Exercise Clause could plausibly require a narrowly drawn exception, limited to religious organizations' hiring of employees the Court independently concludes to be ministers, even under "rational basis" review.
A narrow reading of Hosanna-Tabor would provide an important religious accommodation while also taking account of the heightened establishment concerns that arise in an institutional accommodation setting. A carefully drawn ministerial exception would provide focused, crucially important benefit to religious institutions while imposing relatively low costs on others. 139 The exception would harmonize with the Court's pre-Smith decisions on mandatory accommodation. Those cases, as discussed above, found limited room for mandatory accommodation, reflecting what I contend is the influence of nonestablishment principles. 140 In that spirit, we can read Hosanna-Tabor as implicitly validating Establishment Clause concerns about broad institutional accommodation by limiting the ministerial exception through careful definition and active judicial oversight. The one word in the Hosanna-Tabor Court's effort to distinguish Smith that does meaningful work is "internal."
141 The Court's emphasis on the validity of religious institutional autonomy for internal decisions about institutional structure, while imprecise, fits with earlier accommodation decisions that took the Establishment Clause seriously. In particular, my proposed reading of Hosanna-Tabor follows logically from Amos, the high-water mark of institutional religious accommodation. 142 Although Amos involved a discretionary accommodation, its shielding of religious institutions from regulatory burdens on immediately religious aspects of their hiring decisions provides a strong template for a carefully drawn ministerial exception.
143
B.
The contraceptives for female employees at no additional cost. 145 In its initial form, what has come to be called the "contraceptive mandate" exempted "houses of worship." When the government announced the mandate, various religious employers demanded exemptions. The objectors included religious institutions that are not "houses of worship," such as religious nonprofit hospitals and universities, as well as private, for-profit employers. They claimed that aspects of the contraceptive mandate burdened their religious exercise by requiring them to provide insurance for conduct that violated their religious beliefs. Over the ensuing months, the Obama administration issued various iterations of a proposed compromise. The regulation, as it stands now, allows certain nonprofit religious institutions to opt out of paying for contraceptive coverage. Their employees may secure that coverage at no cost from the employer's insurance carrier, which can apply to the federal government for reimbursement. Many religious institutions remain dissatisfied with the compromise and are pursuing legal challenges. The regulation does not provide any relief to private, for-profit employers, several of which are also pursuing legal challenges.
146
The contraceptive mandate controversy involves factual nuances beyond my very brief account and presents a cluster of difficult, contentious legal and policy issues. I do not seek to address them all here. I merely want to analyze the broad strokes of the administration's proposed compromise under principles of accommodation and nonestablishment. I make the following assumptions: the contraceptive mandate requires employers generally to engage in conduct that violates some employers' sincere, deeply held religious convictions; core religious institutions, such as churches, are flatly exempt from the mandate; the regulation exempts many other religious institutions from the requirement to pay for contraceptive coverage, creating an alternative process for those institutions' employees to get the coverage, with the federal government ultimately paying for it; all private, for-profit employers must obey the mandate; the regulation ensures that all employees who get health insurance through their employers will have access to contraceptive coverage at no additional cost. Does a policy with these elements provide a meaningful religious accommodation? Should it satisfy serious Establishment Clause review?
Those two questions pull in opposite directions, but I think the answer to both is yes. 147 The compromise does not fully satisfy either accommodationist or nonestablishment interests. From an accommodationist standpoint, the exemption should extend to private, for-profit employers, and religious employers should not have to play even an indirect role in providing services that violate their theological commitments. From a nonestablishment standpoint, the compromise grants special government solicitude to a particular class of religious believers and entities; the government should not pay to relieve religious institutions of financial obligations; and, per this essay's emphasis, the compromise implicates especially serious concerns by accommodating not individuals but a class of institutions. The accommodationist objections, in my view, stretch the Establishment Clause past its breaking point. Exempting private employers from the mandate would depend on an implausibly broad conception of "religious exercise" while opening the door to a potentially limitless set of Lochner-esque objections to economic regulations. Further insulating religious nonprofits from employees' contraceptive coverage could allow the employers to block affordable contraceptive coverage as a term of employment. 148 Shifting health insurance from employers to either a government-based single payer system or a direct consumer purchase system would eliminate the problem, but our employer-based system appears entrenched. The nonestablishment objections to the compromise should yield as well. The costs of the compromise are diffused and fairly minimal, and the government's role protects employees who want contraceptive coverage from the power of the accommodated religious employers. Because the contraceptive mandate presents a distinctive problem, its resolution need not predetermine any other institutional accommodation dispute that may arise in the future. Under all the circumstances, this compromise provides a reasonable model for a regime of discretionary religious institutional accommodations that respects nonestablishment principles.
CONCLUSION
The new religious institutionalism offers a normatively appealing case for heightened legal accommodation of religious institutions. Individual believers, standing alone, cannot fully realize their religious interests or easily contribute their distinctive perspectives to public discourse. They need institutional structures in order to fulfill those goals, and religious institutions need accommodations in order to function effectively. At the same time, the newly energetic case for institutional accommodation compels reconsideration of the Establishment Clause as a limiting principle. From the 1960s through the 1980s, 148 See, e.g., Statement of Cardinal Timothy Dolan Responding to June 28 Final Rule on HHS Mandate, http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-137.cfm (condemning the Obama Administration's revised accommodation on the ground that "[t]he objectionable items will still be paid for by virtue of the fact that an employee belongs to the Catholic employer's plan.").
the Establishment Clause substantially constrained discretionary accommodations and also appears to have influenced the Supreme Court's wariness of mandatory accommodations. The Smith decision fundamentally changed the doctrinal landscape, marginalizing the Establishment Clause as a limit on accommodation as surely as it neutered the Free Exercise Clause as a source of accommodation. A robust regime of institutional religious accommodations would change the landscape again. Just as religious institutions exceed individual believers' capacities, they also exceed individual believers' power. Under any forceful conception of nonestablishment, institutional accommodations give greater cause for concern than individual accommodations. The Court's decision in HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, properly understood, provides a crucial mandatory accommodation while limiting social costs. The federal government's proposed response to the contraceptive mandate controversy provides a substantial discretionary accommodation while dispersing social costs. Neither resolution is doctrinally crisp or theoretically pure, but both provide encouraging models for reconciling two substantial, competing values that ultimately serve the same end: maintaining a vibrant, dynamic, democratic culture.
